What Is the Relationship Between Language and Thought?: Linguistic Relativity and its Implications for Copyright by Yoo, Christopher S.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
9-27-2021 
What Is the Relationship Between Language and Thought?: 
Linguistic Relativity and its Implications for Copyright 
Christopher S. Yoo 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, Communications Law Commons, Communication 
Technology and New Media Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Intellectual 
Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Language Description and Documentation Commons, 
Programming Languages and Compilers Commons, and the Psycholinguistics and Neurolinguistics 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Yoo, Christopher S., "What Is the Relationship Between Language and Thought?: Linguistic Relativity and 
its Implications for Copyright" (2021). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2625. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2625 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
1 
What Is the Relationship Between Language and Thought?:   
Linguistic Relativity and Its Implications for Copyright 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
ABSTRACT 
 To date, copyright scholarship has almost completely overlooked the 
linguistics and cognitive psychology literature exploring the connection between 
language and thought.  An exploration of the two major strains of this literature, 
known as universal grammar (associated with Noam Chomsky) and linguistic 
relativity (centered around the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), offers insights into the 
copyrightability of constructed languages and of the type of software packages at 
issue in Google v. Oracle recently decided by the Supreme Court.  It turns to 
modularity theory as the key idea unifying the analysis of both languages and 
software in ways that suggest that the information filtering associated with the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be a general strategy for managing complex systems 
that is not restricted to language.  It also examines Jerry Fodor’s application of 
modularity theory to cognition and his Language of Thought Hypothesis to see 
what they reveal about the idea-expression dichotomy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 What is the connection between language and thought?  Much of copyright depends on 
the answer to that question being “not much.”  For example, copyright has long distinguished by 
the ideas being expressed and the words used to express them, with legal protection being 
reserved exclusively for the latter.1  The Court relied on this dichotomy when rejecting 
arguments that copyright violates the First Amendment, concluding that giving authors exclusive 
control over certain expression does not prevent others from articulating the same ideas using 
different words.2  Limits to the dichotomy also underlie the “merger doctrine,” which denies 
copyright protection when there is only one way to express an idea way for the simple reason 
that exclusive control over the expression would be tantamount to control over the idea itself.3 
 Despite the foundational character of these principles, the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.,4 offered hints of ways that language and 
thought may enjoy a deeper connection than is generally recognized.  In holding that Google’s 
use of the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) created for Java by Oracle’s predecessor, 
 
1 For the seminal statement, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).  For further statements, see 
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2021); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012); Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Feist Publc’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); Harper 
& Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
2 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (holding that the “idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still 
protecting an author's expression”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (holding that the idea-expression dichotomy constituted 
one of two “built-in First Amendment accommodations” included in copyright, quoting Harper & Row). 
3 Although the doctrine is typically viewed as originating in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), Pamela 
Samuelson’s careful review of the doctrinal history concludes that it actually originated in Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev’d, 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).  See 
Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 417, 419–25 
(2016). 
4 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021). 
3 
Sun Microsystems, constituted fair use, it recognized that APIs play a critical organizing 
function that arranges and groups tasks in a particular way.5  The Court supported this 
observation with a “rough analogy” to the way spoken languages “divides into sets of concepts a 
world that in certain respects other languages might have divided differently.”6 
 Although the opinion cited no authority as support for this analogy, the Court’s 
observation tied into a long-running debate in the fields of linguistics and cognitive psychology 
over the extent to which thought and language are independent of one another.  The linguistic 
relativity school, animated by the concept known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, asserts that 
people think in terms of specific languages and that the native language that a person speaks 
shapes the way that person perceives the world.7  Such claims also resonate with claims that 
some concepts cannot be translated into other languages and that thinking in another language 
often involves a different mode of thought, the inherent sexism of using of “he” as the dominant 
indefinite pronoun,8 and the frequent observation that training in the language of the law teaches 
students to “think like a lawyer.”9  It also appears prominently in fiction, with the most familiar 
example likely being George Orwell’s 1984, in which the government created a language called 
“Newspeak” based on the premise its structure would prevent people from thinking certain 
thoughts.10  Other prominent examples exist as well.11   
 
5 Id. at 1192. 
6 Id. 
7 The term was coined by a student of Edward Sapir.  See Harry Hoijer, The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, in 
LANGUAGE IN CULTURE:  CONFERENCE ON THE INTERRELATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND OTHER ASPECTS OF CULTURE 
92 (Harry Hoijer ed., 1954). 
8 See Jane H. Hill & Bruce Mannheim, Language and World View, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 381, 387–
90 (1992) (providing a survey of early research on this topic). 
9 See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL:  LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 17–
18, 28 (2007) (providing an argument based on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that teaching law students to use certain 
language shapes their perceptions and influences their orientations). 
10 Appendix:  The Principles of Newspeak, in GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 303 (1949).  
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 Other scholars have sharply contested the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.  Most notably, Noam 
Chomsky’s theory of universal grammar downplays the impact of context and instead contends 
that genetics and biology lead all speech to follow a set of uniform syntactic rules.12  The 
controversy has ebbed and flowed over the years, with different sides holding preeminence at 
different times.13  At this point, the last word seems far from being said. 
 Despite the key role that the putative independence between language and thought plays 
in key copyright doctrines, copyright scholars have paid virtually no attention to these important 
lines of research, and an extended discussion analysis of its insights and limitations has yet to 
appear in the legal academic literature.14  No article have explored its implications for 
foundational concepts such as the idea-expression dichotomy, the related merger doctrine, and 
the exclusion of the functional aspects of works. 
 This Article seeks to fill this void by exploring these competing schools of thought and 
their importance for copyright law.  Part I lays out the debate between linguistic relativity and 
universal grammar.  Given the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’s emphasis on how language structures 
 
11 For example, Robert Heinlein describes “Speedtalk,” a language in which the faster communication made 
possible by the compression of words into single syllables promotes superintelligence.  Robert Heinlein, Gulf, 
ASTOUNDING FICTION, Nov. 1949, at _.  He also refers to the engineered language, Loglan, in ROBERT HEINLEIN, 
THE MOON IS HARSH MISTRESS 13, 17, 19, 381 (1966).  On a lighter note, the character, Amy Farah Fowler,  in the 
popular television series, The Big Bang Theory, twice refers to languages she has constructed.  The Big Bang 
Theory:  The Skank Reflex Analysis (CBS television broadcast Sept. 22, 2011); The Big Bang Theory:  The 
Deception Verification (CBS television broadcast Sept. 26, 2013). 
12 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES xii (1957). 
13 See, e.g., Joshua Hartshorne, Does Language Shape What We Think?, SCI. AM. MIND (Aug. 18, 2009), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-language-shape-what/. 
14 The only discussion of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of any note appearing in the copyright literature appears 
to be a two-page passage in Fred Koenigsberg’s Meyer Lecture.  I. Fred Koenigsberg, Humpty Dumpty in 
Copyrightland, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 677, 678–80 (2004).  A student note on constructed languages 
mentions linguistic relativity when describing the origins of Loglan without analyzing it in any depth.  Michael 
Adelman, Note, Constructed Languages and Copyright:  A Brief History and Proposal for Divorce, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 544, 548 (2014).  Michael Madison has alluded to the concept in footnotes.  See Michael J. Madison, A 
Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1631 n.469 (2004); Michael J. Madison, 
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 439 n.25 (2003). 
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affect thought, the next two Parts discuss the implications of this debate for the copyrightability 
of different types of languages:  Part II considers the colorful world of constructed languages, 
such as Tolkien’s elvish and Esperanto, analyzing how different types are animated by different 
goals and discussing the role of copyright in furthering those goals.  Part III addresses the 
application of copyright to software, paying particular attention to the “rough analogy” between 
software and natural languages drawn by the Supreme Court in Google LLC v. Oracle America, 
Inc.15  It uses modularity theory as the key idea unifying the analysis of both languages and 
software in ways that suggest that the information filtering functions associated with the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis may be a general strategy for managing complex systems that has importance 
far beyond language.  It also briefly examines Jerry Fodor’s application of modularity theory to 
cognition to see what it reveals about the idea-expression dichotomy. 
 A better understanding of these cutting-edge debates in linguistics and cognitive 
psychology promises to provide new insights into key aspects of copyright law.  I hope that it 
also provides a contribution to the emerging field of law and linguistics.16 
I. EXPLORING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 
 The debate over the relationship between language and thought has lasted for over a 
century.  Part A traces the early 20th century rise of what has become known as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, which contends that the grammatical structure of a person’s native language 
influences the way people perceive the world.  Part B discusses the emergence of universal 
grammar during the 1960s and its implication that all languages embody the same structure, 
 
15 141. S. Ct. 1183, 1192 (2021). 
16 See Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 
769 (1995); The Syntax of Justice Conference, NORTHEASTERN UNIV. (Apr 13, 2017), 
https://cos.northeastern.edu/news/syntax-justice-conference/. 
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which in turn suggests that language structures cannot have a differential impact on the way 
people think.  Part C examines the revival of interest in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that began in 
the 1990s, which shifted focus away from the impact of a language’s grammatical structure and 
towards the context in which particular language is used. 
A. The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and Linguistic Relativity 
 Although discussions of linguistic relativity are generally framed in terms of the “Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis,” the appellation is widely regarded as something of a misnomer.17  In the 
words of Hill and Mannheim, “just as the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor 
an empire, the ‘Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’ is neither consistent with the writings of Sapir and 
Whorf, nor a hypothesis.”18 
 Although theories about the connection between language and thought has other 
historical antecedents,19 Frank Boas, who is widely recognized the founder of anthropology in 
the U.S., is generally credited for introducing it into the modern debate.  Boas broke with the 
 
17 See, e.g., Caleb Everett, Evidence for Language-mediated Thought in the Perception of Non-gendered 
Figures, 52 TEX. LINGUISTIC F. 24, 24 (2008); He Jing, The Validity of Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis—Rethinking the 
Relationship Among Language, Thought and Culture, 9 US-CHINA FOREIGN LANGUAGE 560, 561 (2011); Maia 
Kutateladze, Language Definition and Its Relation to Culture, PROC. 6TH INT’L CONF. ON AM. STUD. 10, 14 (2008); 
available at 
https://eduhum.ibsu.edu.ge/old/files/Menu%20Items/6th_International_Conference_on_American_Studies.pdf; 
Bruce I. Kodish, What We Do with Language – What It Does with Us, 60 ETC:  REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 383, 384 
(2003–2004). 
18 Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 386. 
19 The theory has roots in the 19th-century writings of Vico and Wilhelm von Humboldt.  For overviews of 
the historical roots, see DELL H. HYMES, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); J.P. PENN, 
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY VERSUS INNATE IDEAS:  THE ORIGINS OF THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS IN GERMAN 
THOUGHT (1972); Danny K.H. Alford, Benjamin Whorf Revisited, Part I:  Demise of the Whorf Hypothesis, 4 
PHOENIX:  NEW DIRECTIONS STUD. MAN 84, 94–96 (1980); Ranjit Chatterjee, Reading Whorf Through Wittgenstein:  
A Solution to the Linguistic Relativity Problem, 93 LINGUA 37, 40–43 (1985); John J. Gumperz & Stephen C. 
Levinson, Introduction:  Linguistic Relativity Re-Examined, in RETHINKING LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY 1, 4–5 (John J. 
Gumperz & Stephen C. Levinson eds., 1996); John E. Joseph, The Immediate Sources of the “Sapir Whorf-
Hypothesis,” 23 HISTORIOGRAPHIA LINGUISTICA 365 (1996); E.F. Konrad Koerner, The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis:  A 
Preliminary History and a Bibliographical Essay, 2 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1992). 
7 
conventional wisdom of the day that regarded Western European cultures and languages as 
superior to others in favor of a belief that all languages and cultures are of equal worth.  Boas 
rejected claims that the structure of a language limited its speakers’ ability to engage in abstract 
thought.20  Interestingly, at times Boas appeared to endorse the existence of a fundamental 
grammar that spans all languages based in fundamental psychological processes21 that preexist 
language,22 while on other occasions he emphasizes how the grammar of different languages 
may incorporate “different fundamental categories.”23   
 Boas’s student, Edward Sapir, extended his work by taking a more systematic approach 
to the study of language.24  Sapir believed that “[l]anguage is a guide to ‘social reality’” and that 
“[h]uman beings . . . are very much at the mercy of the particular language that has become the 
medium of expression for their society.”25  As a result, “the ‘real world’ is to a large extent 
unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group,” with different languages creating a 
different “social reality” and speakers of different languages live in “distinct worlds, not merely 
the same world with different labels attached.”26  Like Boas, Sapir stopped short of advancing 
the deterministic claim that a person’s native language limits their ability to perceive reality or 
 
20 Franz Boas, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANGUAGES, PART 1, at 1, 64 (1911) (“It 
seems very questionable in how far the restriction of the use of certain grammatical forms can really be conceived as 
a hindrance in the formulation of generalized ideas.  It seems much more likely that the lack of these forms is due to 
the lack of their need.”).   
21 Id. at 71 (concluding that “the occurrence of the most fundamental grammatical concepts in all languages 
must be considered as proof of the unity of fundamental psychological processes”); id. at 43 (averring that “in each 
language only part of the complete concept we have in mind is expressed”). 
22 Id. at 43 (opining that “each language has a peculiar tendency to select this or that aspect of the mental 
image which is conveyed by the expression of the thought”). 
23 Id. at 43. 
24 See generally EDWARD SAPIR, SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPIR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND 
PERSONALITY (David G. Mandelbaum ed., 1983). 
25 Edward Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, 5 LANGUAGE 207, 209 (1929). 
26 Id. 
8 
conceive of ideas, stating, “It would be naïve to imagine that any analysis of experience is 
dependent on pattern expressed in language.”27 
 But the locus classicus of linguistic relativity was provided by an unlikely person, 
Benjamin Whorf.28  A chemical engineer by training and profession who studied linguistics 
under Sapir at Yale, Whorf remained outside the academy his entire career and published his key 
works in nontraditional journals.29  His work did not become widely known until the posthumous 
publication of a collection of his works in 1956 following his untimely death at the age of forty-
four.30 
 Beyond studying mere words, Whorf analyzed the structure and the grammar of Native 
American languages.  He observed that language represents the primary way that human beings 
organize the “kaleidoscopic flux of impressions” that bombard them every day.31  Individuals do 
not create those categories themselves.  Instead, all speakers are “parties to an agreement” to 
organize those concepts in a particular way, and that “agreement . . . holds through our speech 
community and is codified in the patterns of our language.”32  As a result, the categories 
presented by any particular language are “absolutely obligatory.”33  Indeed, “we cannot talk at all 
except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement 
 
27 Edward Sapir & Morris Swadesh, American Indian Grammatical Categories, 2 Word 103 (1946), reprinted 
in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF EDWARD SAPIR 133, 140 (William Bright ed., 1990). 
28 Gumperz & Levinson, supra note 19, at 5; Koerner, supra note 19, at 181. 
29 John B. Carroll, Introduction, in BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE THOUGHT, AND REALITY:  SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 1, 3–5, 16, 18–20 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956).  Apparently, Whorf only 
prepared a single article for an audience of linguists.  Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 390. 
30 WHORF, supra note 29. 
31 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42 TECH. REV. 229 (1940), reprinted in BENJAMIN LEE 
WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY:  SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 207, 213 (John B. 
Carroll ed., 1956). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 213–14. 
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decrees.”34  Thus, “no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is 
constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free.”35 
 The saliences and exclusions embedded in any particular language in turn filter the way 
its speakers view the world, channeling them towards different perceptions of the same physical 
phenomena.36  As Whorf noted, “users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their 
grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar 
acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive at somewhat 
different views of the world.”37  From this perspective, “the background linguistic system (in 
other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing 
ideas but rather is itself a shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual’s mental 
activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade.”38 
 Thus, “[e]very language and every well-knit technical sublanguage incorporates certain 
points of view and certain patterned resistances to widely divergent points of view.”39  In other 
words of the editor of Whorf’s collected writings, “the structure of a human being’s language 
influences the manner in which he understands reality and behaves with respect to it.”40  
 
34 Id. at 214. 
35 Id. 
36 Whorf, supra note 31, at 214. 
37 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Linguistics as an Inexact Science, 43 TECH. REV. 61 (1940), reprinted in WHORF, 
supra note 29, at 220, 221. 
38 Whorf, supra note 31, at 212. 
39 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Mind, and Reality, THEOSOPHIST, Jan./Apr. 1942, reprinted in WHORF, 
supra note 29, at 246, 246–47.  In this way, Whorf sounded themes that anticipated the influential work, THOMAS R. 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1955).  Whorf observed, “These resistances not only isolate 
artificially the particular sciences from each other; they also restrain scientific spirit as a whole from taking the next 
great step in development—a step which entails viewpoints unprecedented in science and a complete severance from 
traditions.”  Whorf, supra, 247 
40 John B. Carroll, Introduction, in WHORF, supra note 29, at 1, 23. 
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Language constrains thought and action41 and renders linguistically codable concepts more 
salient and memorable.42   
 Moreover, people become so habituated to the patterns embodied in their native 
languages that they internalize them in ways that affect their experiences, feelings, and 
orientation to the rest of the world.43  The result is a “new principle of relativity, which holds that 
all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless 
their linguistic backgrounds are similar.”44 
 Whorf supported his claims with empirical observations.  For example, Whorf asserted 
that the fact that the Inuit language contained more distinct words for snow than other languages 
permitted the Inuit people to perceive a greater variety of distinctions between different types of 
snow.45  Whorf also claimed that the fact that the Hopi language perceived of time as a 
continuous process instead of as a series of discrete, countable instances caused them to perceive 
space and time differently.46  He regarded Hopi as proving that Newtonian conceptions of time 
and space are the product of culture and language instead of being the result of objective 
observations of an underlying universal reality.47   
 
41 STANLEY R. BARRETT, ANTHROPOLOGY:  A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THEORY AND METHOD 20 (1996). 
42 JOHN LYONS, LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 305 (1981). 
43 GUY DEUTSCHER, THROUGH THE LANGUAGE GLASS: WHY THE WORLD LOOKS DIFFERENT IN OTHER 
LANGUAGES 5, 187, 208 (2010).  
44 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42 TECH. REV. 229 (1940), available at 
https://archive.org/details/MIT-Technology-Review-1940-04/page/n15/, reprinted in BENJAMIN WHORF, 
LANGUAGES, THOUGHT, AND REALITY:  SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 233, 244 (John B. Carroll 
ed., 1956). 
45 Whorf, supra note 31, at 216.  The observation was first advanced by Sapir’s teacher, Franz Boas, 
Introduction, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANGUAGES, PART 1, at 1, 21–22 (Franz Boas ed., 1911). 
46 Benjamin Whorf, The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi, 12 LANGUAGE 127 (1936), 
reprinted in LANGUAGES, THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 44, at 51. 
47 Benjamin Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE, 
AND PERSONALITY:  ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD SAPIR 75 (Leslie Spier ed., 1941), reprinted in LANGUAGES, 
THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 44, at 134, 152–53.  Whorf reportedly believed that this difference in language 
 
11 
 Methodologically, Boas, Sapir, and Whorf shared a belief that linguistics required the 
deep, contextual study of specific languages as they are actually practiced.  In so doing, they 
disagreed with those favoring the abstract study of languages, who believed that language and 
culture were distinct and that insight could be obtained without fluency in the language being 
studied.48 
 These linguistic theories have deep philosophical roots as well.  For example, Immanuel 
Kant built on the Platonic vision of a real world cannot be directly perceived, which he called the 
noumenal world.  Instead, people could perceive of the phenomenal world, which is the product 
of physical the senses interpreted through a person’s categories of understanding.49  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein explicitly tied cognition to language when he averred, “The litmus of my language 
means the limits of the world” and “[a]bout which one cannot speak, one must remain silent.”50  
Friedrich Nietzsche famously called language a “prison house” that shapes thought.51  Bertrand 
Russell believed that the “logically perfect language” he had created “will be completely 
analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied.”52  Other 
philosophers argued that different languages can offer different representations of the world,53 
including such notables as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Gottfried Leibniz, who 
 
would permit Hopi to understand Einstein’s theory of relativity more easily.  Frank Heynick, From Einstein to 
Whorf: Space, Time, Matter, and Reference Frames in Physical and Linguistic Relativity, 45 SEMIOTICA 35 (1983). 
48 Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 386.   
49 See M.A. Smirnov, Kantian Philosophy and “Linguistic Kantianism, 37 KANTIAN J. 32 (2018); Ralph L. 
Carnes, A Perceptual Model of the Whorfian Hypothesis, 71 ETC:  REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 263, 265–68 (2014).  On 
the connections between Plato and linguistic relativism, see T.D. Crawford, Plato’s Reasoning and the Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis, 13 METAPHILOSOPHY 217 (1982). 
50 See Ranjit Chatterjee, Reading Whorf Through Wittgenstein:  A Solution to the Linguistic Relativity 
Problem, 67 LINGUA 37 (1985). 
51 See Graham Parkes, Nietzsche on the Fabric(ation) of Experience, 9/10 J. NIETZSCHE STUD. 7, 25–26 
(1995). Robert P. Pula, The Nietzsche-Korzybski-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?, 49 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 50 
(1992); Tracy B. Strong, Language and Nihilism:  Nietzsche’s Critique of Epistemology, 3 THEORY & SOC’Y 239 
(1976); Bradd Shore, Is Language a Prisonhouse?, 2 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 115, 117–20 (1987). 
52 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 58 (1918). 
53 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORLD AND OBJECT 51–57 (1965). 
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speculated that an artificially constructed language “could more accurately capture the true 
essence of things.”54  Thomas Kuhn’ would later offer a related argument in the field of the 
history of science, asserting that the paradigm under which scientists operate at any particular 
time filter the way they perceive data and can even lead them to reject valid data that are 
inconsistent with that paradigm.55 
 The literature began to distinguish between strong and weak versions of the hypothesis.56  
The strong version, often called linguistic determinism, claims that a person’s native language 
determines her thought and worldview.57  The weak version more modestly claims that a 
person’s native language influences her thoughts and worldview, typically called linguistic 
relativity, which regards thought and action as linguistically and socially mediated.58   
 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis commanded considerable attention during the 1950s and 
1960s, generating a significant body of supportive scholarship and series of conferences devoted 
to the topic.59  Early empirical studies seemed to confirm the weak version of the hypothesis by 
showing speakers of different languages could better remember colors that were more salient in 
their native language.60  Another oft-cited study conducted by Alfred Bloom claimed that the 
fact that the Chinese lacks a subjunctive voice made it more difficult for Chinese speakers to 
 
54 Joshua Foer, Utopian for Beginners:  An Amateur Linguist Loses Control of the Language He Invented, 
NEW YORKER, Dec. 24, 2012, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/12/24/utopian-for-
beginners. 
55 KUHN, supra note 39. 
56 DAN I. SLOBIN, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 122 (1971). 
57 Id. at 120. 
58 SLOBIN, supra note 56, at 120. 
59 Koerner, supra note 19, at 182; DELL H. HYMES, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
174–76 (1983); ROBERT L. MILLER, THE LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY PRINCIPLE AND HUMBOLDTIAN 
ETHNOLINGUISTICS:  A HISTORY AND APPRAISAL 12 n.6 (1968). 
60 For brief surveys of the early empirical literature, see Paul Kay & Willett Kempten, What Is the Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis?, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (n.s.) 65, 66–67 (1984); and LYONS, supra note 42, at 307–22. 
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understand counterfactuals.61  Through the first half of the twentieth century, linguistic relativity 
had clearly established itself as the organizing principle for studying the connection between 
language and thought.62   
B. Chomsky and Universal Grammar 
 The 1960s witnessed the rise of a new school of thought championed by Noam Chomsky 
that rejected the importance of linguistic differences and instead conceived of language in more 
universal terms.  Chomsky’s theory was a response to the behaviorism of B.F. Skinner that was 
the dominant paradigm of the day that sought to explain language as the environmental product 
of stimulus-response and eschewed any analysis of psychological processes.63  Behaviorism 
treated internal mental processes as a black box and focused on predicting future actions based 
on evidence from the past.64 
 Chomsky countered that children could not possibly be exposed to sufficiently stimuli in 
the time they learn language for contextual factors to be the sole explanation.65  Instead, all 
languages must reflect a universal grammar that is genetically encoded into all people, reflected 
in his now famous claim that people innately regard the structure of the sentence, “colorless 
green ideas sleep furiously,” as grammatically correct even though the sentence is itself 
 
61 ALFRED H. BLOOM, THE LINGUISTICS SHAPING OF THOUGHT (1981). 
62 Gumperz & Levinson, supra note 19, at 2. 
63 B.F. SKINNER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR (1957). 
64 Yarden Katz, Norm Chomsky on Where Artificial Intelligence Went Wrong, ATL., Nov. 1, 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/11/noam-chomsky-on-where-artificial-intelligence-went-
wrong/261637/. 
65 George A. Miller & Noam Chomsky, Finitary Models of Language Users, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 419, 429–30 (R. Duncan Luce et al. eds., 1963). 
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meaningless.66  Language acquisition involves learning the meanings; children’s understanding 
of grammatical structure is, in contrast, innate.   
 The existence of such a universal grammar would undercut claims that differences in the 
structures of different languages could have any impact on the way a person thought or saw the 
world.  Moreover, it favors approaching “language acquisition as a logical problem that can be 
solved in principle without looking at the development of actual children in detail.”67  As a 
result, Chomsky was sharply critical of the Whorfian connection between grammatical categories 
and world view as well as his bottom-up contextual approach to studying language.68 
 At the same time, linguistic relativity also received a strong challenge from cognitive 
psychology, which began emphasizing “the commonality of human cognition and its basis in 
human genetic endowment.”69  For example, Steven Pinker argues that thought is completely 
independent of language and rejects the idea that people think in a native language.70  Instead, 
Pinker asserts that people think in a meta-language he calls “mentalese.”71  To these scholars, 
language ability is a genetic trait shared by the entire human race.72 
 An empirical literature began to emerge that sought to corroborate universal grammar.  
For example, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay showed that different languages that used the same 
number of focal colors tended to use the same colors, suggesting that the concept of colors likely 
have a biological root.73  Other studies attempted to debunk the specific examples regarding 
 
66 CHOMSKY, supra note 12, at 15. 
67 COOK & NEWSON, supra note _, at 78.  
68 Noam Chomsky, Introduction, in ADAM SCHAFF, LANGUAGE AND COGNITION v (Olgierd Wojtasiewicz 
transl. & Robert S. Cohen ed., 1973). 
69 Gumperz & Levinson, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
70 STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 67–73 (1994). 
71 Id. at 82. 
72 Id. at 10; see also CHOMSKY, supra note 12, at xii. 
73 BRENT BERLIN & PAUL KAY, BASIC COLOR TERMS (1969). 
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references to time in Hopi (even calling it “hoax”),74 the number of words for describing snow in 
Inuit,75 and the Chinese language’s inability to reflect counterfactuals,76 with one study 
characterizing the scholarship on Inuit as a “hoax.”77  Others focused their criticism on the 
inherent circularity in experimental designs that rely on language to determine what a person is 
thinking.  As Daniel Casasanto helpfully summarizes the critique, “the only evidence that people 
who talk differently also think differently is that they talk differently!”78  The basic principle that 
correlation cannot prove causation means that the causal direction of the effect is ambiguous and 
that both effects may be caused by a third unobserved factor.  Attempts to conduct field tests of 
the hypothesis failed when the community supporting the test language fragmented.79 
 Interestingly, the differences between Chomsky’s views on the one hand and Boas’s, 
Sapir’s, and Whorf’s views on the other hand may not have been as extreme as is sometimes 
surmised.  In the words of one commentator, “Boas, Sapir, and Whorf were not relativists in the 
extreme sense often suggested by modem critics, but assumed instead a more limited position, 
recognizing that linguistic and cultural particulars intersect with universals.”80  Indeed, Whorf 
recognized the existence of “a universal . . . way of linking experiences which shows up in 
 
74 EKKEHART MALOTKI, HOPI TIME: A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TEMPORAL CONCEPTS IN THE HOPI 
LANGUAGE (1983). 
75 Piotr Cichocki & Marcin Kilarski, On “Eskimo Words for Snow”: The Life Cycle of a Linguistic 
Misconception, 37 HISTORIOGRAPHIA LINGUISTICA 341 (2010); Laura Martin, “Eskimo Words for Snow”: A Case 
Study in the Genesis and Decay of an Anthropological Example, 88 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (n.s.) 418 (1986); 
Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax, 7 NAT. LANGUAGE & LINGUISTIC THEORY 275 (1989). 
76 Terry Kil-Fong Au, Chinese and English Counterfactuals:  The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis Revisited, 17 
COGNITION 155 (1984); Lisa Garbern Liu, Reasoning Counterfactually in Chinese:  Are There Any Obstacles?, 21 
COGNITION 239 (1985); Yohtaro Tokano, Methodological Problems in Cross-Cultural Studies of Linguistic 
Relativity, 31 COGNITION 141 (1989). 
77 Pullum, supra note 75. 
78 See Daniel Casasanto, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Whorf?  Crosslinguistic Differences in Temporal 
Language and Thought, 58 LANGUAGE LEARNING 63, 67 (2008). 
79 See infra note 198 and accompanying test (on the failure of Loglan). 
80 Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 383. 
16 
laboratory experiments and appears to be independent of language—basically alike for all 
persons.”81   
 Nonetheless, advocates of the universal grammar adopted a surprisingly dismissive and 
combative tone when criticizing Whorf’s work.82  Other attacks against linguistic relativity have 
been more ad hominem.  For example, instead of engaging with the merits of Whorf’s work, 
some critics attempted to dismiss him as an amateur.83  Others have defended Whorf and other 
linguistic relativists against these attacks.  They argued that many of the attacks are based on 
mischaracterizations of Whorf’s work.84  Others attempted to rebut the challenges to Whorf’s 
examples,85 noting that the derisive tone of these critiques “hindered sophisticated discussion 
about the issues” and that the critics’ analysis fell prey to the same flaws they accused Whorf of 
perpetrating.86  As for the personal criticisms leveled at Whorf, his supporters point to the 
 
81 Whorf, supra note 39, at 267 
82 See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 70, at 57 (calling the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, “wrong, all wrong” and “a 
conventional absurdity”); Pullum, supra note 75.  Indeed, Pinker referred to his 1994 book as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis’s “obituary.”  STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT 124 (1997). 
83 PINKER, supra note 70, at 59–60; Pullum, supra note 75, at 276.   
84 GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS 328 (1987); PENNY LEE, THE WHORF THEORY 
COMPLEX—A CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (1996); JOHN A. LUCY, LANGUAGE DIVERSITY AND THOUGHT:  A 
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384–85, 388, 390; Stephen O. Murray, Canonical Texts, 89 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (n.s.) 443 (1987). 
85 For rehabilitations of Whorf’s analysis of Hopi, see JOHN LEAVITT, LINGUISTIC RELATIVITIES:  LANGUAGE 
DIVERSITY AND MODERN THOUGHT 180 (2011); JOHN A. LUCY, LANGUAGE DIVERSITY AND THOUGHT:  A 
REGULATION OF THE LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY HYPOTHESIS 286 (1992); David W. Dinwoodie, Time and the 
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AND REPRESENTATIONS 341 (Sergei Kan ed., 2006); Kodish, supra note 17, at 390; Penny Lee, Whorf’s Hopi 
Tensors:  Subtle Particulars in the Language/Thought Nexus?, 3 LINGUISTICS 123 (1991); Stephen C. Levinson, 
Foreword, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALTY vii, xii (2d ed. 2012); John A. Lucy, The Scope of Linguistic 
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Krupnik & Ludger Müller-Wille, Franz Boas and Inuktitut Terminology for Ice and Snow: From the Emergence of 
the Field to the “Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax,” in KNOWING OUR ICE: DOCUMENTING INUIT SEA ICE 
KNOWLEDGE AND USE 377 (Igor Krupnik et al. eds., 2010). 
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recognition he received during his lifetime87 and recharacterized being called an amateur as a 
badge of honor worthy of the word’s noble origins as “a lover of the subject”88 that more 
reflected the shortcomings of linguistics as an academic profession than any deficiencies in 
Whorf’s work.89 
 Despite these efforts to defend linguistic relativity, by the 1980s, Chomsky’s theory of 
universal grammar emerged as the dominant paradigm,90 and linguistic relativity was clearly in 
decline.91  Even as sympathetic an observer as the editor of the landmark 1956 compilation of 
Whorf’s works was forced to conclude in 1992 that “most linguists and psychologists believe 
that evidence offered in [the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’s] support is flawed” and that the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis “has come to be regarded as either unconfirmable or incorrect.”92  Steven 
Pinker even authored what he called its “obituary,” calling it “wrong, all wrong” and “a 
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conventional absurdity.”93  Some commentators even spoke of its death or its demise and 
conducted autopsies exploring why.94  Konrad Koerner more optimistically predicted a revival of 
interest in the 1990s.95  
C. The Revival of Linguistic Relativity 
 Koerner was ultimately proved correct:  Since the 1990s, linguistic relativity has enjoyed 
something of a renaissance.96  The intellectual focus has shifted away from the purported impact 
that a language’s structure and grammar can have on people’s thoughts.  Instead, scholars have 
begun exploring the impact that contextual uses of certain language can have on people’s 
thoughts. 
 A new generation of empiricists has begun to explore new dimensions of linguistic 
relativity.97  Paul Kay, who coauthored the study widely regarded as establishing color as a 
universal concept,98 conducted new experiments indicating that “a more cautious Whorfianism 
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seems to be supported by the results reported here.”99  Other color studies have found similar 
effects.100  Studies focusing on spatial characterizations in language have shown that members of 
an aboriginal culture in Australia whose language describes space in cardinal-direction terms 
(north, south, east, west) demonstrated better spatial knowledge and arranged items in sequence 
in a different manner (east-to-west) than did speakers of language who describe space in relative-
direction terms (left, right, forward, backward).101   
 Other studies suggest that speakers of languages that use horizontal metaphors for time 
perceive the world differently than speakers of languages that use vertical metaphors for time.102  
Similarly, the ability to estimate duration of time varied based on whether the speaker’s language 
measured to duration in terms of length (long, short) instead of amount (big, little).103  Still other 
studies have examined how grammatical gender in a language can affect perception.104  New 
research methods have emerged, such as those studying the perception of motion and emotion105 
and those comparing bilingual and monolingual speakers.106  Perhaps most celebratedly, the fact 
that the language spoken by Brazil’s Pirahã tribe lacks many supposedly universal features of 
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language, including numbers, color, dependent clauses, myths, fiction, and art and used the 
simplest forms of pronouns and kinship references raises doubts about the universality of certain 
language structures.107  Indeed, the lack of numbers appears to limit the Pirahã’s ability to do 
mathematics.108   
 One of the more recent forays into the ways that language can affect thought is known as 
evidentiality,109 which has become a hot topic in linguistics circles.110  Although the concept was 
first recognized by Boas,111 Roman Jakobson introduced the term “evidential” into the linguistic 
vocabulary in 1957.112  Languages that use evidentials mandate as part of their grammar that the 
speaker “specify the information source in which a statement is based—whether the speaker saw 
the event happen, didn’t see it but heard it (or smelt it), made an inference about it based on 
visual traces or reasoning or general knowledge, or was told about it.”113  Evidentials’ obligatory 
nature in these languages increases the availability and salience of information sources114 and 
accents “[t]he distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other.’”115  They also require a level of specificity 
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that can change discourse and politics.116  Their use also becomes embedded in social 
practices.117  Indeed, those coming from language traditions requiring evidentials feel the gap 
when speaking languages that do not require them.118  These speakers may even greet the failure 
to provide the evidential provenance of reported information with suspicion.119  Moreover, 
evidentiality’s implications for linguistic relativity are clear.120   
 A shift in developmental psychology, while continuing to recognize the importance of 
universals, began to place renewed emphasis on the role that cultural context plays.121  At the 
same time, linguistics and anthropology have focused increased attention on how the ways that 
language is used can create meaning in ways that go beyond lexicon and grammar in ways that 
seem culturally specific.  For example, Alan Rumsey followed Whorf’s structural approach and 
compared European languages’ ability to report the exact wording of quoted speech and the lack 
of similar structures in the language of the Ngarinyin people of northwestern Australia.122  
George Lakoff argued that the key to understanding language is not its structure and its grammar, 
but rather the metaphors that it embodies, which can affect the way speakers of the language 
perceive different phenomena.123 
 The linguistic relativity revival has also drawn support from the perceived inadequacies 
of universal grammar, which Chomsky initially refined into a theory known as Principles and 
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Parameters.124  The difficulties Chomsky faced in reducing all languages into a single universal 
grammar led him to divide grammar into a core, which consisted of the part subject to the 
universal grammar, and a periphery, which is “whatever is added on in the system actually 
represented in the mind/brain of a speaker-hearer.”125  Chomsky later reformulated his thoughts 
still further into what he now calls the Minimalist Program, which discards almost all of the 
previous analytical categories and attempts to identify the attributes for reducing language to its 
bare essentials.126 
 Critics regard the core/periphery distinction as a telling acknowledgement of the 
inadequacies of Chomsky’s theory.127  Moreover, many regard the shifts in direction and 
increasing abstraction of Chomsky’s framework as problematic.  In the words of Robert Trask: 
[Chomsky’s theory] was an abstract framework to begin with, but it has become 
steadily more abstract, as its proponents, confronted by troublesome data, have 
tended to posit ever greater layers of abstraction, in the hope of getting their 
universal principles to apply successfully at some level of representation.  Critics 
have not been slow to see this retreat into abstraction as a retreat from the data 
altogether, that is as an attempt to shoehorn the data into a priori principles which 
themselves are sacrosanct.  The more outspoken critics have declared the 
[Chomsky] framework to be more a religious movement than an empirical 
science.128 
 Furthermore, attempts to find universals in grammatical rule systems necessarily depend 
on first identifying substantive universals, such as the idea of nouns and verbs, that can serve as 
the building blocks for analysis.  In other words, the project of identifying rule systems depends 
on the existence of a metalanguage that is distinct from all existing languages.  Without such an 
inventory of prior syntactic or semantic properties, one risks relying on familiar categories that 
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may obscure other types of categories or may risk projecting European substantive properties 
onto other languages.129  And it is precisely this metalanguage that Chomsky and his followers 
are finding so hard to develop. 
 Universal grammar has also faced a number of empirical challenges.  The inability to 
teach language to feral children is regarded by some as being more consistent with language 
being learned through cognitive processes than it being an innate, genetic attribute.130  Others 
have pointed out that the fact that language structure evolves more quickly than genes indicates 
that language cannot be genetically determined.131 
 The problems with Chomsky’s insistence on abstraction to the exclusion of contextual 
analysis is most evident in the debate his views of sparked over artificial intelligence (AI).  
Recall that Chomsky believed that the proper goal of linguistics was the logical analysis of 
linguistic structures that match people’s internal psychological processes.  In so, he rejected the 
approach that focused on context in a manner reminiscent of behaviorism and Whorfianism.  In 
Chomsky’s opinion, “probabilistic models give no particular insight into some of the basic 
problems of syntactic structure.”132  Instead, “Linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is 
concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior.  Observed use of 
language . . . may provide evidence . . . but surely cannot constitute the subject-matter of 
linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline.”133  As a result, Chomsky criticized statistical 
modeling and Bayesian approaches to AI for doing nothing more than trying to regenerate prior 
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observations.134  In Chomsky’s view, systems that simply regenerate past data do not improve 
the scientific understanding of the phenomenon.135   
 In this sense, Chomsky endorses what is sometimes called strong AI, which seeks to build 
systems that perform tasks the same way people do, and rejects weak AI, which simply seeks to 
build systems that work regardless of whether their structure models human cognition.136  In 
other words, strong AI employs a non-behaviorist approach in an attempt to gain insights into 
human cognition.  Weak AI uses a behaviorist approach to look for statistical regularities in large 
datasets and treats the internal workings as a black box.137  Chomsky denigrated the latter 
approach as unlikely to yield any explanatory insights or general principles about the nature of 
cognition.138 
 Chomsky’s critique prompted a response from Peter Norvig, who is the Director of 
Research and an AI expert at Google.139  Norvig points to a paper by Leo Breiman arguing that 
statistical modeling falls into two cultures.140  The first culture attempts to create models that 
mimic the mechanisms of nature as closely as possible.  These results they produce provide 
insights into the model, not nature.  The second attempts to create algorithms that map inputs to 
outputs without any expectation that they will do so in a manner that reflects the underlying 
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Nov. 26, 2012, http://jkpate.net/random_words/2012/11/26/a-response-to-noam-chomsky-on-where-artificial-
intelligence-went-wrong/. 
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nature of the phenomenon being modeled.141  Although these latter models model reality 
accurately, they make no attempt to correspond to the processes used by nature and thus provide 
no analytical insight as to mechanisms.  In short, they “describe[] what does happen, but . . . 
[don’t] answer the question of why.”142 
 Norvig argues that Chomsky’s views reflect his commitment to finding elegant 
descriptions of the “deep whys” over “mere explanations of reality.”143  The result is an approach 
that regards the study of actual language as out of bounds and instead seeks to reduce the 
mechanisms of language into an abstract, mathematical form.144  While elegant, this acontextual 
approach proved singularly ineffective in generating working AI, particularly when it comes to 
language.145   
 The exchange between Chomsky and his critics over the best approach to AI recapitulates 
the overarching debate between linguistic relativity and universal grammar.  One side favors 
abstraction and fidelity to cognitive processes at the expense of the ability to explain the features 
of actual languages and the meaning of actual expressions.  The other side focuses on patterns 
identified through empirical observation without any attempt to map those patterns onto 
cognitive processes.  Perhaps most importantly, modern practitioners of AI criticize the 
dichotomy as overdrawn.  Experiments with different forms of statistical modeling that are tied 
to linguistic theory can reveal a great deal about that theory’s validity.146 
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 At this point, the debate between linguistic relativity and universal grammar remains 
unresolved.  The ebbs and flows of the debate over the past few decades make it almost certain 
that the last word has yet to be spoken.  To the extent that a consensus exists, it seems to reject 
the idea that language determines thought, but at the same time accepts that language influences 
thought in important ways.  From this perspective, “what we normally call ‘thinking’ is in fact a 
complex set of collaborations between linguistic and nonlinguistic representations and 
processes.”147  The modern empirical evidence suggests that these mechanisms are quite 
contextual.  On a more fundamental level, the debate reflects the familiar methodological clash 
between theory and empiricism to which the proper answer is that science needs both.148 
II. LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND CONSTRUCTED LANGUAGES 
 The inconclusive state of the debate between these two schools of thought on the 
relationship between language and thought does not stop it from having strong implications for 
copyright.  Given that the central claim of linguistic relativity is that the language a person 
speaks affects the way they perceive and think about the world, one natural question regards the 
merits of giving authors of constructed languages (“conlangs”) exclusive control over their 
creations.149  Constructed languages are those languages whose phonology, morphology, syntax, 
and sometimes alphabet and vocabulary were intentionally devised by one or more humans.  As 
 
147 Lera Boroditsky, Linguistic Relativity, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 917, 920 (Lynn Nadel 
ed., 2003). 
148 On Richard Feynman’s vision about the interconnectedness between theory and empiricism in the context 
of physics, see LAWRENCE M. KRAUSS, QUANTUM MAN:  RICHARD FEYNMAN’S LIFE IN SCIENCE 238 (2011). 
149 Constructed languages are also sometimes called invented, artificial, imaginary, model, or planned 
languages.   
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such, constructed languages stand in contrast to natural or ethnic languages, which evolved 
organically without any human control.150   
 The debate whether permitting authors to copyright an entire language that they created 
has important implications for key copyright concepts, including the idea-expression dichotomy, 
the merger doctrine, and the exclusion of functional works.  Part A lays out the different types of 
constructed languages.  Part B applies the insights of the debate over linguistic relativity. 
A. Types of Constructed Languages 
 Reflecting a long tradition that is usually traced back go Hildegard of Bingen’s Lingua 
ignota during the 12th century,151 people have devised more than 700 constructed languages over 
the years, as compared with the roughly 5,000 languages currently being spoken today.  Interest 
appears to be burgeoning, as reflected by the number of courses on constructed languages 
springing up in universities across the country.152  
 The creation of a constructed language generally follows one of two paths.  An a priori 
approach builds a new language from whole cloth without any reference to earlier languages, 
while a posteriori takes an existing language as its starting point.153  Many scholars have pointed 
out that this distinction is better regarded as a spectrum rather than as a strict dichotomy, since no 
language is completely a priori.154 
 
150 For a useful introduction, see Adelman, supra note 14, at 546.  
151 See SARAH L. HIGLEY, HILDEGARD OF BINGEN’S UNKNOWN LANGUAGE: AN EDITION, TRANSLATION, AND 
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transls., Humphrey Tonkin ed., 1993). 
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 Constructed languages are also categorized by the purpose for which they are intended to 
serve.  Typically, they fall into one of three types:  artistic languages, auxiliary languages, and 
engineered languages. 
1. Artistic Languages 
 Many of the best known constructed languages are artistic in nature (artlangs).  
Prominent examples include the multiple languages invented by J.R.R. Tolkien in The Lord of 
the Rings and his other works, who regarded constructing languages as his “secret vice.”155  
Other prominent examples include Klingon (created for the Star Trek franchise), Na’vi (created 
for the movie Avatar), and Dothraki and Valyrian (created for the television series, Game of 
Thrones).   
 Tolkien undoubtedly regarded the act of constructing a languages to be expressive.  In a 
1931 address, Tolkien recounts an utterance during the middle of a boring lecture that revealed 
that the person was working on a constructed language: 
The man next to me said suddenly in a dreamy voice: “Yes, I think I shall express 
the accusative case by a prefix!”   
 A memorable remark! . . . Just consider the splendour of the words!  “I 
shall express the accusative case. “  Magnificent!  Not “it is expressed,” nor even 
the more shambling “it is sometimes expressed,” nor the grim “you must learn 
how it is expressed.”  What a pondering of alternatives within one’s choice before 
the final decision in favour of the daring and unusual prefix, so personal, so 
attractive; the final solution of some element in a design that had hitherto proved 
refractory.  Here were no base considerations of the “practical,” the easiest for the 
“modern mind,” or for the million – only a question of taste, a satisfaction of a 
personal pleasure, a private sense of fitness.156 
 
155 J.R.R. Tolkien, A Secret Vice, in THE MONSTERS AND THE CRITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 198 (Christopher 
Tolkien ed., 1983). 
156 Id. at 199. 
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Tolkien followed it with an eloquent reflection on the “incipient pleasure found in linguistic 
invention.”157  In fact, Tolkien regarded the languages as more important than the stories:  “The 
‘stories’ were made rather to provide a world for the languages than the reverse.”158 
 Authors of languages constructed for artistic purposes often assert copyrights over those 
languages.  For example, the Tolkien estate asserts that it holds a copyright in the languages that 
Tolkien constructed.  In response to a hypothetical question whether others can write stories set 
in Middle Earth, the FAQ section of the estate’s website unequivocally says no.159  Although the 
website does not specify the legal basis for asserting this right or address the use of Tolkien’s 
constructed languages, subsequent correspondence with counsel for the estate makes clear that 
the estate believes that it holds a copyright in Tolkien’s constructed languages.160  The FAQ 
section for the webpage for “The Elvish Language Fellowship,” which appears to enjoy some 
degree of approval from the Tolkien Estate,161 takes the same position.162  On the other hand, a 
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fan magazine secured a legal opinion from the former general counsel of the National 
Endowment for the Arts stating that Tolkien’s languages cannot be copyrighted.163   
 These statements notwithstanding, the Tolkien estate does not appear to have brought any 
lawsuits to enforce any copyrights in Tolkien’s constructed languages that may exist.164  Wired 
magazine does report that the estate sent a cease and desist letter to Tolkien linguist Helge 
Fauskanger that successfully deterred him from publishing a sixty-page analysis of two 
unpublished texts written in the Tolkien-created language, Quenya,165 even though Fauskanger 
believes that Tolkien’s languages cannot be copyrighted.166  This case is somewhat atypical in 
that the works being analyzed were unpublished, a consideration that militates against fair use.167 
 Paramount Pictures has similarly taken steps to assert a copyright in Klingon.  For 
example, the studio once sent a cease and desist letter to the Klingon Language Institute (KLI) 
asking it to stop using the word Klingon in its literature before subsequently giving KLI a 
copyright and trademark license to Paramount’s intellectual property.168  Since then, Paramount 
and the KLI have enjoyed a more symbiotic relationship.169 
 The copyrightability of Klingon did come closer to having its day in court in Paramount 
v. Axanar, in which studio sued to block a crowd-funded fan film set in the Star Trek universe.170  
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The Language Creation Society moved for leave to submit an amicus brief arguing that 
constructed languages were not copyrightable.171  The court denied the motion, noting that 
because it “d[id] not reach the issue of whether languages, and specifically the Klingon language, 
are copyrightable . . . none of the information provided by Amicus is necessary to dispose of the 
Motion to Dismiss.”172   
 The court later issued an opinion denying cross motions for summary judgment, holding 
that the defendant’s works used elements protected by Paramount’s copyright and that the 
defendant’s works did not constitute fair use.173  The opinion’s discussion of copyrightability 
focused primarily on the use of characters, the Vulcan and Klingon species, and particular 
costumes.174  The court also noted that Paramount and CBS had submitted evidence regarding 
the use of other aspects of the Star Trek universe, including, most importantly for this Article, 
the Klingon language.175  The court sidestepped the issue whether Klingon is by itself 
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copyrightable, stating, “Although each of these elements may not be individually original and 
copyright protectable, they are ‘numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original 
enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship,’ especially when 
combined with the costumes and fictional characters and species, examples of which are 
described above.”176  The case was eventually settled, with Axanar accepting a license for its 
preexisting twenty-minute work and pledging to adhere to Paramount’s new publicly stated 
policy of withholding any objections to fan films that last fifteen minutes or consist no more than 
two segments totaling thirty minutes or less.177 
2. Auxiliary Languages 
 Auxiliary languages (auxlangs) are intended to provide a common basis for 
communication for people from different language traditions.  International auxiliary languages 
(IAL) aspire to be used by everyone.  The first IAL to gain widespread use was Volapük, which 
was first described in 1879 and published as a book in 1880.178  Volapük was superseded by the 
publication of Esperanto in 1887,179 which after passing through some doldrums is enjoying a 
modest revival.180  The International Auxiliary Language Association (IALA) was established in 
1924 to promote IALs, creating its own language, Interlingua, in 1951.181  After IALA closed its 
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doors in 1953, the newly created Interlingua Division of Society of the Science Service took over 
responsibility for promoting the language until 1966.182 
 Other auxiliary languages are described as regional or zonal, in that they are intended to 
be spoken on a regional rather than a global scale.  Prominent examples include pan-Slavic 
Interslavic, Germanic-based Tutonish, and African-based Afrihili.183  A particularly interesting 
example for purposes of this Article is palawa kani, which is an attempt by the Tasmanian 
Aboriginal Center (TAC) to synthesize a coherent language out of fragments of twelve extinct 
indigenous languages.184 
 Auxiliary languages have not given rise to many copyright disputes.  As a result, courts 
have not occasion to address their copyrightability.  Learned Hand did refer to Esperanto when 
denying copyright protection to a list of 6,235 coined words that had no ascribed meaning.185  
The uncopyrightability of a list of words or symbols that the author had not given any meaning 
says nothing about constructed languages, which have full vocabularies and grammar.  At least 
one court expressed skepticism regarding claims that constructed languages such as Esperanto 
are uncopyrightable, calling such arguments “vulnerable” and “depend[ent] on arbitrary 
definitions of words, adopted for undisclosed reasons” that border on “word games.”186 
 In the absence of clear guidance, creators of constructed languages have followed a 
variety of practices.  The desire to have them widely spoken often leads authors to permit broad 
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use and sometimes even consign them to the public domain.187  For example, Esperanto’s 
creator, L.L. Zamenhof, announced that Esperanto is the “property of society, and the author 
renounces all personal rights in it forever.”188   
 At the same time, some creators of auxiliary languages have attempted to use copyright 
to protect their creations.  For example, the Wikimedia Foundation’s 2014 Transparency Report 
revealed that Wikipedia had refused the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre’s request to take down its 
article on palawa kani “because copyright law simply cannot be used to stop people from using 
an entire language or to prevent general discussion about the language. Such a broad claim 
would have chilled free speech and negatively impacted research, education, and public 
discourse — activities that Wikimedia serves to promote.”189  Interestingly, the Centre’s claims 
may not be based exclusively on copyright.190  Filings to the Australian legislature mention a 
wide range of international treaties and conventions on indigenous rights.191  The Centre 
discourages nonaborigines from speaking the language until the aborigines become competent in 
it. 
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3. Engineered Languages 
 Once called research, experimental, or philosophical languages, engineered languages 
(engelangs) are constructed languages designed to satisfy specific objective criteria.  A fairly 
new arrival is Toki Pona, created by Sonja Lang in 2001192 that embodies Taoism by reducing 
complexity and embracing minimalism by using simple sounds and roughly 120 words.193  
Consistent with  the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Toki Pona attempts to immerse people in the 
moment and to induce positive thinking by using positive words.194  In fact, Lang devised Toki 
Pona to help her deal with depression.195 
 Other engineered languages are constructed to embody certain logical principles with 
intention of making language more precise.  A particularly interesting example for the purposes 
of this Article is Loglan, which sociologist James Cooke Brown created in 1955 in order to 
conduct a real-world test of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis itself.  Specifically, he designed the 
language based on the principles of predicate logic in order to see if the structure of the language 
shaped the way its speakers think.196 
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INFORMATIONEN 51, 51 (2011); Renato Fabbri, Basic Concepts and Tools of the Toki Pona Minimal and 
Constructed Language, ARXIV.ORG (July 4, 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.09359.  Lang now has produced at 
least two authoritative texts.  SONJA LANG, TOKI PONA:  THE LANGUAGE OF GOOD (2014); SONJA LANG, THE TOKI 
PONA DICTIONARY (2021). 
193 Blahuš, supra note 192, at 51; Zach Tomaszewski, A Formal Grammar for Toki Pona (2012), available at 
https://www2.hawaii.edu/~chin/661F12/Projects/ztomaszewski.pdf; Amber Dance, Babel’s modern architects, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2007, 12:00 AM PT), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-aug-24-sci-conlang24-
story.html. 
194 Blahuš, supra note 192, at 54; Dance, supra note 193; Roc Marin, How to Say (Almost) Everything in a 
Hundred-Word Language, ATLANTIC (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/toki-pona-smallest-language/398363/; Siobhan Roberts, 
Canadian has people talking about lingo she created, GLOBE & MAIL (July 9, 2007), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/canadian-has-people-talking-about-lingo-she-
created/article20399052/. 
195 Dance, supra note 193; Roberts, supra note 194. 
196 James Cooke Brown. Loglan, SCI. AM., June 1960, at 53, 55. 
36 
 These categories are not always mutually exclusive.  Many constructed languages span 
more than one category.  For example, Suzette Haden Elgin created Láadan both as an artistic 
language as part of the Native Tongue series of novels as well as an engineered language 
designed both to express the perceptions of women and to test the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.197 
 Engineered languages have given rise to occasional legal disputes.  For example, tensions 
began to flare with respect to Loglan during the 1980s, mostly out of frustration with the slow 
pace with which Loglan’s creator, James Cooke Brown, was developing the language.  These 
tensions erupted into an outright schism when Brown responded to Robert LeChevalier’s 
creation of computer flashcards to help study the language by demanding that LeChevalier sign a 
statement acknowledging that Brown held the copyright in Loglan and pay Brown royalties to 
use it.198  In March 1987, Brown eventually sent LeChevalier a cease and desist letter asserting 
that use of the term Loglan violated Brown’s trademark.  The courts would eventually uphold the 
Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s refusal to register the 
trademark on the grounds that Loglan represented the generic name for a language.199 
B. The Implications of the Linguistic Relativity Debate 
 The literature exploring the copyrightability of constructed languages is vanishingly thin, 
consisting of one student note,200 a magazine article published by the ABA Section Intellectual 
Property Law,201 and two memorandum opinions prepared by private attorneys for the 
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constructed language community.202  These commentaries conducted their analysis by applying 
conventional doctrinal categories such as originality, fixation, the idea-expression dichotomy, 
functionality, and fair use.  The only mention of linguistic relativity is a passing reference during 
the description of Loglan’s origins that contained no analysis of the theory.203  The omission is 
unfortunate because the debate over linguistic relativity has clear implications for the 
copyrightability of constructed languages.   
1. Universal Grammar 
 Consider first universal grammar, which contends that all languages follow the same 
innate structure.  It has limited, but important, implications for the copyrightability of 
constructed languages.  If correct, universal grammar suggests that permitting authors to 
copyright a constructed language poses no problem unless the protection includes the universal 
structure that all languages must follow.  Note that even this claim does not necessarily mean 
that constructed languages cannot enjoy any copyright protection whatsoever.  Universal 
grammar applies only a language’s structural elements and appears to omit nonstructural aspects.  
Copyrighting other aspects of a language thus pose no conceptual problems.   
 Moreover, as noted earlier, universal grammar’s proponents have struggled to articulate a 
principled basis for determining what lies within the core of a language as opposed to the 
periphery and which linguistic elements constitute part of Chomsky’s Minimalist Program.204  
The difficulties surrounding how to locate the boundary between the core and the periphery are 
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reminiscent of Judge Learned Hand’s observation about levels of generality in Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp.: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left 
out.  The last may be no more than the most general statement of what the play is 
about, and at times might only consist of its title; but there is a point in this series 
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright 
could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his 
property is never extended.205 
At one level of generality, both of the plays at issue in that case were similarly about a young 
Irish man and a young Jewish woman who become estranged from their families after they 
secretly wed, only to become reconciled later.206  At another level of generality, the plays are 
quite different in terms of the role of religion, the device through which reconciliation occurs, 
and the characterization of the fathers.207  Whether the second play infringes the first depends on 
the level of generality used to define what is the essence of each.  Unfortunately, “[n]obody has 
ever been able to fix that boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can.”208 
 The theory of universal grammar offers an analytical framework that can provide some 
traction on this question.  Elements that reside in the core identified by the Minimalist Program 
clearly belong on the idea side of the dichotomy.  This framework does not provide a complete 
solution, since there are many statements are properly regarded as falling with the province of 
ideas instead of expression even though they are not language structure. 
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2. Linguistic Relativity 
 Linguistic relativity provides greater insight, militating in favor of imposing greater limits 
on the copyrightability of constructed languages.  The Supreme Court has recognized that 
“choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the 
compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity” may merit copyright protection even if the 
components combined together are uncopyrightable.209  As the Second Circuit has noted, “Every 
kind of work at some level is . . . an arrangement of uncopyrightable ‘common elements.’  No 
individual word is copyrightable, but the arrangement of words into a book is.  No color is 
copyrightable, but the arrangement of colors on canvas is.”210  The Seventh Circuit similarly 
upheld the copyrightability of certain greeting cards even though they were composed of 
elements that were not separately copyrightable.211  The court held that although elements such 
as size, color, paper, ink border design, stripes, ellipses, and single-sided format “are not 
individually capable of protection, just as individual words do not deserve copyright protection, 
it is the unique combination of these common elements which form the copyrighted material.212  
Other judicial decisions concur,213 as does the guidance issued by the Copyright Office.214  That 
said, the scope of copyright protection is “thin,” covering only the originality associated with the 
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selection and arrangement of the uncopyrightable elements and not the uncopyrightable elements 
themselves.215 
 Consider the ordering of the three principal parts of a sentence:  subject (S), verb (V), and 
object (O).  Simple mathematics reveals that there six possible orders in which to put these three 
elements.216  With such a limited set of possibilities, giving any author copyright protection in 
one of them would be problematic.  However, not all six occur with equal frequency among 
natural languages.  A 2016 survey of 5,252 languages found the following frequencies for each 
pattern:  SOV 43.3%, SVO 40.3%, VSO 9.5%, VOS 3.3%, OVS 0.7%, and OSV 0.3%.217  
Earlier studies identified similar patterns.218   
 The creator of Klingon deliberately chose the OVS pattern and sounds that rarely occur in 
natural languages in order to make them sound more alien.219  The sound combinations also 
made the language sound harsher, consistent with the characterization of Klingon culture as 
bellicose and jingoistic.220  Individually, the features may be uncopyrightable, but the 
combination of these elements may be sufficiently creative to be copyrightable.  In the words of 
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Klingon’s creator, Marc Okrand, “There is no sound in Klingon the does not occur in any 
number of natural languages, but the particularly inventory of sounds is unique to Klingon.”221   
 Linguistic relativity introduces an additional consideration by implying that the saliences 
and resistances embedded in a language’s structure makes certain concepts more memorable and 
filters the way they perceive the world.  If so, language structures become deeply functional and 
fall closer to the idea side of the idea-expression dichotomy.  The connection between language 
structure and thought may in fact cause the two to merge and thus lose copyright protection, 
because giving authors of constructed languages the exclusivity over a particular structure risks 
giving those authors de facto control over how to induce a particular pattern of thought.   
 In this sense, linguistic relativity also has the potential to add the type of substantive 
content to the idea-expression dichotomy that Learned Hand thought was unattainable.  At the 
same time, it threatens to undermine the Supreme Court’s reliance on the independence between 
language and ideas deemed essential to justifying copyright protection, at least with respect to 
the structure of a constructed language.222   
3. Differences Among Types of Constructed Languages 
 In addition, different types of constructed languages naturally implicate the concerns of 
copyright in different ways.  For example, structural choices for artistic languages are likely to 
be driven by expressive considerations.  More functional works are less inherently expressive.223  
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For example, engineered languages tend to be primarily functional, as they are designed to 
achieve some particular end.224 
 Auxiliary languages are less susceptible to broad generalizations.  Consider first IALs, 
whose primary purpose is to provide all people with a common basis for communication.  As 
such, they are often regarded to be driven more by pragmatism than by commitment to strong 
conceptual principles.225 
 Interestingly, each of the key figures in the debate over linguistic relatively have offered 
their views of IALs, adopting strikingly divergent positions.  Chomsky did not address IALs in 
his published, but he has discussed them in interviews.  Although Chomsky’s belief in a 
universal grammar might have led him to support the creation of a single language that all people 
could speak,226 his belief in language as a biological phenomenon led him to reject the idea that 
any true language can be constructed.227  Because it is a natural phenomenon, language can best 
be (and perhaps only be) understood studying existing languages.228  This led him to dismiss “the 
concept of inventing a language’ as “very misleading”229  and why he claimed Esperanto was not 
a language and instead involved only “the invention of extremely superficial elements of 
language.”230  In addition, he regarded the desire for a universal language as being “based on an 
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illusion.”231  The need for subject matter to study made it “more efficient to have . . . a whole lot 
of languages” than to teach a “parasitic” system that simplifies other languages.232  Since all 
natural languages are simply dialects of the one universal human grammar, and there is no reason 
to prefer one over another.233   
 The implications of linguistic relativity are less clear.  Whorf shared Chomsky’s 
antagonism toward IALs, but for very different reasons.  Whereas for Chomsky the existence of 
an inherent universal language made the differences embodied in natural languages nothing more 
than superficial variations of no particular significance, Whorf thought that differences across 
languages were essential attributes that must be preserved.  Indeed, he “believe[d] that those who 
envision a future world speaking only one tongue . . . hold a misguided ideal and would do the 
evolution of the human mind the greatest disservice.”234  “The only correctives” to the hegemony 
of the point of view inherent in the structure of Western languages “lie in all those other tongues 
which by aeons of independent evolution have arrived at different, but equally logical, 
provisional analyses.”  Thus, the nontranslatability of languages represented not just a barrier to 
the construction of a single, universal language; it signals an important source of the diversity of 
thought that IALs would homogenize.  Whorf’s view that languages are tied to culture and are 
inherently untranslatable necessarily entails that, in the words of one commentator, “there is no 
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 Sapir, in contrast, adopted a much more sanguine stance toward IALs.  As noted earlier, 
Sapir saw a looser connection between linguistic structure and thought than did Whorf.236  This 
distance led Sapir to accommodate IALs to an extent Whorf could not.  Sapir backed his 
academic rhetoric with action.  He played an active role in shaping the research program of the 
International Auxiliary Language Association.237  In addition to authoring a key memorandum 
on IALs in 1925,238 he also took a three-month sabbatical to conduct research for IALA in 1929, 
served as IALA’s first Research Director from 1930-31, and served on its Advisory Board for 
Linguistic Research from 1927 until his death in 1939.239 
 Sapir’s support for IALs was also manifest in his scholarly writings.  In his 1931 article 
on “The Function of an International Auxiliary Language,” Sapir emphasized the unquestioned 
“theoretical desirability” and “logical necessity” of IALs.240  Not only would adoption of an IAL 
avoid the “necessary evil” of the costs associated with translation and impaired comprehension; 
the growing demands of modernity require a language that does more than “merely extend[] the 
imperfections and provincialism” of prior languages and would instead incorporate a greater 
degree of logic, richness, and creativity than any of its predecessors.241  If successful, the 
resulting IAL would provide a “broad base for every type of international understanding . . . for 
every type of expression of the human spirit which is of more than local interest.”242  His entry 
on “Language” in the 1933 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, sounded similar themes, calling 
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IALs a “logical necessity . . . in modern times” and criticizing claims of “the supposed 
artificiality” of Esperanto and other IALs as “absurdly exaggerated.”243  He saw less promise in 
zonal languages, predicting that attempts to revive regional languages would fail in the face of 
burgeoning internationalism.244 
 Sapir and Whorf thus differed on IALs.  While Sapir regarded them as very promising, 
Whorf derided them as an unfortunate attempt that would homogenize thought along Western 
lines.  While clearly averse toward the universality of IALs, Whorf did not clarify whether he 
thought that zonal auxiliary languages provide sufficient variation to support innovations in 
thought. 
 Constructed languages serve values beyond the goals of serving as an outlet for creative 
expression, pragmatically supporting international communication, and promoting logical 
thinking.245  IALs are often said to support substantive goals as well.  For example, Sapir noted 
providing the entire world with a common basis for communication would serve as “one of the 
most potent symbols of the freedom of the human spirit that the world has yet known.”246  He 
predicted that, despite the growing importance of language as a symbol of cultural difference and 
sovereignty, attempts by minority populations to revive regional languages would likely fail in 
the face of burgeoning embrace of internationalism.247 
 Esperanto has become “associated with an almost mystical humanism” centered on the 
belief that adoption of a common language will reduce conflict and promote understanding, 
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despite attempts in some quarters for it to remain ideologically neutral.248  For example, L.L. 
Zamenhof’s foundational pamphlet that launched Esperanto rejected “see[ing] Esperanto [as] just 
a practical affair.”249  Instead of “fear[ing] offending those people who want to use Esperanto 
only for practical purposes,” he embraced “the sacred, grand and important idea that an 
international language contains itself . . . brotherhood and justice among all peoples,”250 themes 
that Zamenhof would reiterate in his later speeches and writings.251  Whether it was because of 
the language itself or because of Zamenhof’s charismatic vision, the community of Esperanto 
speakers has developed into a movement committed to Zamenhof’s values including “pacifism, 
antimilitarism, internationalism, [and] predominantly left-leaning and progressive causes.”252  
The depth of the accession of these values is demonstrated tragically by Esperantists’ persecution 
by Hitler and Stalin.253 
 Zonal auxiliary languages embody values that overlap the internationalist and universalist 
commitments associated with IALs.  Part of the motivation for pursuing zonal constructed 
languages is pragmatic:  a common language is easier to create and to learn when the speakers’ 
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native tongues belong to the same language family.254  With respect to substantive values, some 
are quite similar to those espoused by IALs, such as greater participation in transnational e-
democracy and support for computer translation.255 
 But proponents of zonal auxiliary languages advance them for other reasons that are quite 
different from those associated with IALs.  Some proponents see zonal auxiliary languages as a 
defense against the effect that the growing hegemony of English is having on other cultures.256  
Others regard them in more affirmatively constitutive terms, seeing them as a means to promote 
a sense of ethnicity257 in a manner similar to revitalized languages, such as Hebrew, Irish, 
Cornish, Hawaiian, Māori, and Welsh.258  Zonal auxiliary languages may thus represent a 
potential revival of the Romantic nationalism that characterized the 19th Century.259  In the case 
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of palawa kani, its creators hope that its use will build a more cohesive sense of community by 
fostering a Tasmanian aboriginal way of thinking in the manner environed by linguistic 
relativity, to the point where they hope to forbid nonaborigines from using the language until it is 
better established.260  Far from seeking to provide a universal basis for communication, zonal 
auxiliary languages are necessarily confined to “small, fragmented, often ideologically 
homogenous groups of speakers, sharing a common standpoint to which the conlang in question 
has only a secondary, instrumental role.”261  Unlike IALs, universal acceptance is not the goal 
for zonal auxiliary languages.  These developments have made “traditional claims of neutrality 
and universalism” seem “outdated.”262 
 Linguistic relativity provides an additional impetus to this goal.  Not only would a zonal 
auxiliary language provide a common basis for communication within this group; speaking a 
language of the same structure would further build community by inducing them to perceive the 
world in the same way (although the similarity of the languages within the zone may limit the 
marginal impact of this effect).  Universal grammar would see no such benefit.  The existence of 
a uniform structure that spans all languages would render constructing a shared language a poor 
tool for constituting smaller communities within the larger society. 
 The constitutive role to auxiliary languages can have a dark side as well.  A 2012 New 
Yorker article described how amateur linguist John Quijada accepted an invitation to and 
attended a university conference focusing on the engineered language he created known as 
Ithkuil only to distance himself from that intellectual community out of concerns of having his 
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language associated with pseudoscience, far-right pan-Slavic nationalism, terrorism, and a 
potential cult.263  Authors of other constructed languages have expressed similar misgivings 
about their lack of control over the languages they created.264 
4. Copyright as a Mechanism for Control 
 Constructed languages thus face a delicate balance.  On the one hand, their vitality often 
depends on their being adopted by a sufficient number of people to maintain viability.  This is 
particularly true for auxiliary languages, whose goal is to increase people’s ability to 
communicate across language boundaries.265  The benefits of scale counsel in favor of removing 
limits on people’s ability to access the language, although these benefits would eventually 
exhibit diminishing marginal returns and would be less important for artistic languages, whose 
aesthetic goals are not necessarily closely tied to widescale use.  
 At the same time, other considerations tilt in favor of allowing creators of constructed 
languages to exercise a degree of stewardship and control.  Some degree of governance may be 
necessary to give a constructed language the stability and uniformity it needs to thrive.  But 
adoption of a constructed language is voluntary, and participants always remain free to divide the 
community by starting a variant of their own.266 
 Consider the example of Esperanto.  As questions arose about the optimal rate with 
which the language should evolve, Esperanto’s founder came to believe that promoting the 
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adoption of Esperanto depended on a degree of stability.267  He therefore took the position that 
“the foundation of Esperanto must strictly remain absolutely unchanged” until several nations 
had adopted it.268  A schism eventually erupted when Louis Couturat presented the Delegation 
for the Adoption of an International Language with a new language based on Esperanto called 
Ido, which became the first of many offshoots of Esperanto, generally called Esperantidos.269  
These have largely faded from the scene while Esperanto has survived, an outcome some 
attribute in part to the guidance of the Universal Esperanto Association, which has largely 
resisted calls for significant change.270  
 Nor was this dynamic unique to Esperanto.  Volapük split into two when supporters 
became frustrated with its creator’s reluctance to expand the language.271  Lojban and the 
Logical Language Institute split from Loglan and the Loglan Institute over disagreements with 
the creator’s assertions of control.272  The schisms hurt the overall development of the language 
and divided the number of speakers into smaller groups.273  Conversely, the leadership of 
Klingon creator Marc Okrand is generally regarded as having had beneficial effects.274 
 Similar patterns can be found in open source software projects, which similarly depend 
on voluntary acceptance by a broad community in order to succeed.275  Many people complain 
that the existence of too many small changes, each pushed through by an engineer attempting to 
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leave a mark on a project, can serve as a major barrier to adoption.276  Open source projects can 
also fork either because of mismanagement by the current leadership or from a desire to push the 
project in a different direction.277  The classic example is Unix, which shattered into multiple 
variants on both the commercial and the academic side.278  Linux, in contrast, has remained 
unified to date, because of key management reforms and avoidance of personality disputes.279 
 Such risks are always present for both constructed languages and open source projects.  
Just as the nature of open source give supporters the right to fork a project, speakers of a 
language always have the right to begin creating and speaking a different variant of the 
language.280  The open source solution has been the adoption of a strong norm against forking 
and reliance on strong central leadership by a so-called “benevolent dictator” or a governing 
body.281  The term, dictator, is a tad misleading:  While leaders exercise gatekeeper control in the 
short run, the community remains free over the long haul to liberate themselves from any 
strictures imposed if those leaders are not sufficiently responsive to the needs of the 
community.282 
 And sometimes, the desire for control comes not from the need to regulate the rate of 
change or personal disputes, but rather from a desire to use language to build solidarity within a 
community, exemplified by palawa kani’s attempt to exclude nonaborigines from speaking it.283  
Alternatively, it may implicate personality theory by allowing the constructed language’s creator 
to control the ideas and communities with which it is associated. 
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 Copyright represents one of the principal means for asserting this type of control, 
reflected by the Tolkien estate’s claim of copyrights in elvish,284 James Cooke Brown’s 
assertions of a copyright in Loglan,285 and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centers’ claim of a 
copyright in palawa kani.286  It is also the device employed by the open source community to 
protect its values:  Rather than consign open source software to the public domain, authors of 
open source software copyright the code and license it subject to the requirement that any code 
built from it also be open source.287   
 To the extent that such concerns have validity, they strengthen arguments for giving 
constructed languages the benefit of copyright protection.  As the example of open source 
demonstrates, control can be used to ensure that a language remains open as well as to assert 
exclusive control, if the rightsholder deems that doing so is in their best interest.288  They are 
likely to be well positioned to act as good stewards so long as their personal interests align with 
the promoting the success of the constructed language.289 
III. LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND SOFTWARE 
 Although the copyrightability of constructed languages is a fascinating topic, the 
analogous questions around software carry far more practical importance.  In terms of 
copyrightability, the uncertainty that once surrounded whether computer programs were eligible 
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to receive copyright protection was largely resolved by legislation enacted in 1980.290  The 
precise scope of that protection is less clear.  In one of the most hotly anticipated copyright 
decisions in quite some time, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to both issues in Google 
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.291  The Court had granted certiorari on the Federal Circuit’s 
conclusions both that application programming interfaces (APIs) are copyrightable and that 
copying them did not constitute fair use but chose to dispose of the case on fair use grounds 
without addressing copyrightability.292   
 In terms of copyrightability, courts generally distinguish between copying the actual lines 
of code (called the “literal elements” of the computer program) and the code’s sequence, 
structure, and organization (SSO) (called the computer program’s “non-literal elements”).293  
The Supreme Court’s decision not to address copyrightability was unfortunately, as the federal 
courts of appeals have divided over the copyrightability of SSO, with six circuits holding that 
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protection is possible if the selection and arrangement is sufficiently original294 and with one 
circuit holding that SSO represents an uncopyrightable method of operation.295   
 An article on the application of linguistic theory is not the appropriate venue for resolving 
this dispute.296  Instead, my purpose is to examine what light, if any, the debate over linguistic 
relativity sheds on the protection of a computer program’s nonliteral elements.  Indeed, its 
insights into the connection between the structure of language and functionality can guide the 
assessment of the impact of extending copyright protection to a software package’s structural 
elements. 
A. Universal Grammar 
 At first glance, a theory that asserts the existence of a single universal grammar would 
seem to be loath to extend copyright protection to SSO.  Giving an author exclusive rights over 
the one possible language structure would be tantamount to giving that author control over the 
entire function of language. 
 Closer inspection reveals that such concerns are likely overstated.  Recall that universal 
grammar presumes that human language follows a universal structure that is genetically coded 
into all people, demonstrated by children’s ability to acquire language with minimal exposure to 
it.297  This rationale does not generalize to software because computers are not limited by the 
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genetics that govern human beings.  The structures that software can adopt are thus not limited to 
the structures underlying human language, making extending copyright protection to a software 
package’s SSO less problematic. 
B. Linguistic Relativity 
 SSO copyrights raise greater concerns under linguistic relativity.  The central claim of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that language structures shape the way people perceive the world by 
making certain aspects mandatory and more salient while deemphasizing others.  Although the 
mechanism that linguistic relativity envisions is a matter of human cognition, it has a direct 
analogue in software design.  Software was once created as a single, integrated whole, but over 
time software architects found it convenient to break larger programs down into smaller 
subroutines.298   
 Subroutines require a predefined interface that other programs can use to call upon their 
services.  For example, software packages must typically know the name of the subroutine, the 
content and format of the inputs the subroutine needs to perform its functions, and the content 
and format of the subroutine’s output.299  To use the example cited in Google v. Oracle, a 
subroutine called max that determines which of two integers (in this case 4 and 6) is larger could 
be called through the subroutine call max(4,6) and be expected to return the number 6.  Note that 
more complex subroutines also need rules on how to respond to unusual situations, such as 
incomplete data, improper syntax, parameters that fall outside the range of expected values.300  
For example, anyone with even minimal experience using the World Wide Web knows that 
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Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) returns the error message, “404 Not Found,” when a call is 
submitted for a webpage that does not exist.301 
 The SSO at issue in Google v. Oracle reflects an added level of complexity.   The 
developers of Sun Java did more than just create subroutines, which they called methods, each 
with its own implementing code.302  They also grouped similar methods into what they called 
classes and in turn grouped similar classes into libraries they called packages.303  They then 
relied on this hierarchy to establish the syntax that must be used to call the subroutine.  To use 
the example discussed above, Sun Java’s syntax requires the call to specify the name of the 
relevant package (java.lang), class (Math), and method (max) along with the parameters 
required by the method being called, which in this case yields the following link:  
java.lang.Math.max(4,6).304  The parties refer to this type of link as the declaring code, which 
served as the primary focus of the case.305 
 Although the Court did not address copyrightability, its fair use discussion provides 
interesting indications that help inform that inquiry.  When focusing on the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the Court indicated that computer programs differ from purely aesthetic works 
such as “books, films and many other ‘literary works’” in that they “almost always serve 
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functional purposes.”306  Computer code thus inevitably involves a mixture of expressive and 
functional features, which forces courts to confront difficult questions about which those aspects 
are protectible and which are not.307 
 The Court also found that APIs are different from other types of software.  In contrast to 
the typical computer program, APIs’ declaring code play a distinctive role in inherently binding 
four types of elements:  (1) Sun Java’s system for dividing up computing tasks in a particular 
way, which according to the Court “no one claims is a proper subject of copyright”; (2) the 
general idea of organizing tasks into a hierarchy, which the Court concluded was 
uncopyrightable; (3) the specific commands used to obtain the services of a subroutine, which 
Oracle did not suggest was copyrightable; and (4) the code implementing particular subroutines, 
which everyone agrees is copyrightable but Google did not copy.308  The only creativity involved 
is in choosing declaring names that programmers would find “intuitively easy to remember.”309 
 The Court further took notice of the testimony “drawing [a] critical line between user-
centered declaratory code and the innovative implementing code.”310  From this, the Court 
concluded that the declaring code embedded in user interfaces “differs to some degree from the 
mine run of computer programs” in that they “inherently b[i]nd together uncopyrightable ideas 
(general task division and organization) and new creative expression (Android’s implementing 
code).”311  Moreover, software systems like Java Sun and Android drive their “value in 
significant part  . . . from the value that those who do not held copyrights, namely, computer 
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programmers, invest of their own time and effort to learn the API’s system” and from 
“encourag[ing] programmers to learn and to use that system.”312  This inherently close tie 
between declaring code and functionality places it “further . . . from the core of copyright” that 
other types of computer programs and “points in the direction of fair use.”313   
 The Supreme Court’s assertion that no one asserts that the particular manner in which 
Sun Java organizes tasks is copyrightable is subject to question.314  Under Feist and its progeny, 
the copyrightability of compilations of uncopyrightable elements turns on whether the selection 
and arrangement of those elements was sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.315  
The Federal Circuit’s decision on copyrightability thus acknowledged Oracle’s concession that 
the idea of employing the package-class-method structure is not copyrightable but held that 
Oracle could copyright “its particular way of naming and organizing” the packets, classes, and 
methods in its software package.316   
 The Google Court acknowledged that the names around which the declaring code is built 
represent a certain kind of creativity,317 but failed to acknowledge the possibility of a copyright 
in the selection and arrangement of otherwise uncopyrightable elements acknowledged in Feist.  
This omission is in deep tension with the manner in which the Court described the software, in 
which it noted that “[a]n API divides and organizes the world of computing tasks in a particular 
way.”318  This involves the selection of “precisely which set of potentially millions of different 
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tasks we want to have our Java-based computer systems perform and how we want those tasks 
arranged and grouped.”319   
C. Modularity Theory as the Bridge Between Languages and Software 
 Most importantly for the purposes of this article, the Court came tantalizingly close to 
invoking the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis when it drew a “rough analogy” between natural languages 
and “the declaring code’s organizational features.”320  The declaring code “divides into sets of 
concepts a world that in certain respects other languages might have divided differently” in much 
the same manner as natural languages.321  This reasoning draws a direct parallel between the 
manner in which both software and language channel a complex reality into a particular 
conceptual structure.  The computer science literature on modular systems has shown how the 
interfaces necessarily make certain information visible and other information hidden322 and how 
those decisions predetermine the ways different tasks can interact with one another, which 
ultimately determines the functionality of the overall system.323   
 The computer science literature thus highlights how a software system’s interface 
selectively increase the salience of certain information and downplays the importance of others 
in much the same manner as natural languages under linguistic relativity.  To the extent that the 
structure of natural languages embodies a certain world view, so does a software packages SSO.  
In addition, the deep connection between interface design and the system’s functionality adds 
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another level of depth to the link between the design of a software interface and its functionality 
(and the concomitant implications for copyrightability) identified by the Court. 
 The analogy between modular software and natural language systems potentially 
provides new insight and analytical support for linguistic relativity.  The fact that the process of 
screening and channeling information plays an equally important role in systems that are 
intentionally devised suggests that it is not simply the result of biology, linguistics, or the limits 
of human cognition.324  The incorporation of parallel solutions in such widely disparate contexts 
suggests that it is best understood as a reflection of the process for managing complex systems 
through near decomposition identified by Nobel laureate Herbert Simon.325 
 Modularity theory also explains how the structural choices embodied in a particular 
architecture become institutionalized into an industry’s organizational and intellectual culture.326  
The tendency is captured in what has become known as Conway’s Law, which asserts, in the 
words of two commentators, that “[t]he structure of any system designed by an organization is 
isomorphic to the structure of the organization.”327  Melvin Conway’s original formation 
envisions that organizational structure of the design team determines the design and envisioned 
that the principal mechanisms was communication flows.328  Architectures become enshrined as 
technological paradigms that filter people’s perceptions of which directions seem the most 
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promising.329  Subsequent scholars have suggested that architectural commitments influence 
communication channels by filtering the information that passes through an organization.330  
Technologies that are embedded in a larger system become part of a design hierarchy that 
entrenches a particular technological agenda.331  As Conway noted, designs that have become 
entrenched end up driving the organizational structure instead of the other way around.332   
 The presence of this device in both natural languages and software packages suggests that 
linguistic relativity has roots in the problems posed by all complex systems.  If so, the existence 
of modular structures in other domains suggests that the mechanism underlying Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis is based on robust principles that are foundational.  The fundamental nature of such 
modularity is confirmed by the fact that it is a feature of many other biological systems that have 
nothing to do with cognition, including pathogen structure, gene networks, protein interaction 
networks, and cell networks.333 
 Most interestingly for purposes of this Article, scholars have also used modularity to 
explore human cognition.  Most notably, Jerry Fodor advanced his Modularity Thesis, which 
holds that the brain includes certain innate “vertical” faculties that perform predetermined, 
domain specific functions that produce a narrow range of outputs based on limited set of 
mandatory inputs in much the same manner as subroutines (the modules) that support broader 
“horizontal” faculties that operate as the central system that integrates the unordered mass of 
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information collected from a variety of sources.334  In addition, modules such as language act 
largely autonomous from central control in a manner similar to a reflex.335  His modularity thesis 
drew insights computer science, although some key differences remain.336  Indeed, he discusses 
it in terms of limiting inputs and encapsulating information in a manner almost identical to 
computer scientists.337 
 Fodor did not find “any need to deny the Whorfian point that the kinds of concepts one 
has may be profoundly determined by the character of the natural language that one speaks.”338  
Indeed, Fodor recognized that a person’s experiences will determine which faculties actually get 
employed.339  Fodor’s key difference with Whorf is that he does not regard the human mind as a 
blank slate whose content is determined by the stimuli to which it is exposed.340  Instead, it 
already possesses key innate faculties even in its original state.341  Although Fodor’s views were 
built on the innate faculties underlying Chomsky’s universal grammar, Chomsky disagreed with 
Fodor’s distinction between the central system and modules that operate largely independent of 
that central system as well as Fodor’s belief that the central system could not be fully 
understood.342 
 Fodor’s vision of language as a reflex encapsulated in a module is related to his claim 
that people think in the “Language of Thought,” which similarly posits that thinking occurs in 
abstract terms that are connected to specific languages only through a process of hypothesis 
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formation and testing.343  In so arguing, Fodor adopts the position reflected in Pinker’s claim, 
noted earlier, that humans think in “mentalese” independent of any particular language.344   
 The Language of Thought Hypothesis (often called “LOTH”) has generated a large 
academic literature exploring its tenets both philosophically and empirically in much the same 
manner as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.345  If correct, it suggests that ideas and expression may 
not be as independent as current copyright doctrine presumes.  For example, Anthony D’Amato 
has noted that all of Chomsky’s examples to illustrate his universal grammar “depend[] upon the 
meanings of the words in the sentence.”346  This in turn suggested “that it is a very short step 
from claiming that there is an inherent grammar importuned in our brains to saying there are 
inherent meanings to words.”347   
 Linguistic relativity’s central proposition humans think in terms of specific languages as 
opposed to pure ideas independent of language actually cuts against the unity of ideas and 
expression, although it does suggest a connection between ideas and the structure of the language 
in which that expression is embodied.  This connection inherent in mentalese is not a product of 
the inclusions and exclusions reflected in a language’s structure make certain types of concepts 
more salient, understandable, and memorable.  Moreover, the entire idea that language can 
influence thought necessarily presupposes a degree of independence between the two.348 
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 The debates over these propositions have yet to be resolved and probably never will be.  
Whatever their resolution, key copyright concepts such as the idea-expression dichotomy and the 
merger doctrine hang in the balance. 
CONCLUSION 
 To date, copyright scholarship has almost completely overlooked the linguistics and 
cognitive psychology literature analyzing the connection between language and thought.  An 
exploration of the two major strains of this literature, universal grammar and linguistic relativity, 
offer insights into the copyrightability of both constructed languages and the type of software 
packages at issue in Google v. Oracle recently decided by the Supreme Court.   
 Linguistic relativity theory promises to provide intellectual traction on the heretofore 
intractable challenge of distinguishing between protectible expression and unprotectible ideas.  
Analysis of the principles of linguistic relativity also suggests that the filtering function 
performed both by natural languages and APIs is best understood as an application of modularity 
theory as means for managing complex systems  The robustness of this solution across a wide 
range of domains attests to its fundamental nature.  Moreover, Fodor’s application of modularity 
theory and the Language of Thought Hypothesis to human cognition, if correct, pose a 
fundamental challenge to the idea-expression dichotomy.   
 The application of the insights of linguistic relativity eloquently demonstrate the benefits 
of incorporating linguistics and cognitive psychology into the analysis of copyright.  Even 
though many areas in both fields remain hotly contested, an appreciation of the terms, scope, and 
trends in the debate would enhance our comprehension of copyright. 
 
